The purpose of this article is to describe, not prescribe, the evolving answer to the question of whether a new, significantly elevated substantive standard of FAPE applies in place of Board of Education v. Rowley as a result of the successive changes in IDEA 97 and—punctuated by the NCLB—IDEA 2004. The analysis is divided into five successive parts. Part I provides an overview of the
Supreme Court’s first and foremost IDEA decision, Rowley, in terms of its interpretation of the meaning of FAPE, with special attention to its substantive standard. Part II summarizes the pertinent scholarly commentary in the overlapping literatures of special education and education law. Part III canvasses the case law that addresses the broad changes in the language of IDEA 97, the NCLB, and IDEA 2004. Part IV focuses specifically on the PRR provision of IDEA 2004. Part V analyzes the seeming “Y” in the road represented by hearing officer and court decisions in Iowa and California, respectively. The conclusion discusses the implications in terms of practice, litigation, and policymaking. (Abstract from author)